Don’t cry for me, Shinawatra: why Yingluck’s bad luck is good for Thailand

Had she appeared in front of the Supreme Court’s Criminal Division for Political Office Holders on August 25 and ended up in jail, Thailand’s political temperatures would have heightened markedly. Instead, Thai politics has reached a crossroads after nearly two decades of topsy-turvy instability and turmoil. Whether the country can transcend its “yellow versus red” polarisation to regain its footing will depend on the willingness of its old and new elites to play by the rules and stick to the electoral arena to determine outcomes.

As it has regressed from a promising democracy to an outright dictatorship, Thailand’s political standstill can be reduced to two Shinawatra trials and two military coups, punctuated by four elections, so far in the 21st century. Yingluck’s handling of the rice-pledging scheme, after winning the July 2011 elections by a majority, is reminiscent of her eldest brother Thaksin Shinawatra’s assets concealment trial. Thaksin was charged with hiding several billion baht of assets under the names of his household staff in contravention of the reform-driven Constitution of 1997 that promoted transparency and accountability. The National Counter Corruption Commission had indicted Thaksin on an 8-to-1 vote in December 2000, days before his Thai Rak Thai (TRT) party won a general election in January with 248 seats in the 500-member lower house of parliament.

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In the eyes of his sceptics and the supporters of the 1997 charter, Thaksin had to know that his money was registered under his servants’ names, despite arguing that his wife was responsible for administrative family matters. Many thought that the NCCC’s overwhelming indictment could not be reversed. But Thaksin had the tide of Thai politics going for him at the time. He rose to the premiership promising to kick out the International Monetary Fund and restore Thai economic potential after the devastation and lost national pride from the 1997-98 economic crisis. His TRT-led government had innovative and so-called “populist” policies to boost the grassroots for economic growth through consumption as well as exports. His critics were a small minority. Most people, including many who would later turn out to be his adversaries, were pulling for him.

The Constitutional Court fudged the verdict with an 8-to-7 count. Seven judges ruled Thaksin guilty, the other eight were split. Half concluded he did not know about the hidden assets and the other half said they had no jurisdiction over the case. The decision politicised the 1997 constitution and catalysed Thailand’s democratic downfall. The Constitutional Court lost credibility, whereas the NCCC became marginalised. Not long after, Thaksin absorbed smaller parties and made Thai Rak Thai into a juggernaut, winning re-election in February 2005, this time with 77 per cent of lower house seats.

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This is where Thai politics encountered a major turning point. After his February 2005 victory, Thaksin became as unstoppable as he was overconfident. A mutual antagonism soon emerged between him and established centres of power which had earlier given him the benefit of the doubt. Brinkmanship ensued. Thaksin was as hubristic and defiant as his opponents were self-righteous and vindictive. Limited street protests from August 2005 expanded into the yellow-clad People’s Alliance for Democracy after Thaksin sold his family-owned Shin Corp for 73 billion baht in January 2006, completely tax-free. Thaksin’s sins of graft and conflicts of interest were suddenly exposed. It was an ugly period in Thai politics that eventually ended with a putsch on September 19, 2006. Thaksin was on the back foot, and he kept back-pedalling while staying inside democratic boundaries. Had his opponents not seized power and instead dealt with him in the electoral arena, Thai politics and its fledgling democratic system under the popular 1997 charter might have had a chance for maturation and consolidation.

Seen in this light, the Yingluck court case is par for the course between Thaksin and his opponents. For the prosecution, her case is as weak as the case against Thaksin was strong. Yingluck was not accused of corruption but of negligence of duty over a manipulative rice-pledging policy she had campaigned on to win Thailand’s last election. When the poll timetable was announced in early 2011, the Yingluck-Thaksin team was looking around for a policy platform that could recapture the winning formulas of 2001 and 2005. This had to involve numbers that were easy for voters to remember. And so came 15,000 baht for a tonne of rice, 15,000 baht per month salaries for bachelor's degree holders, a 300 baht per day minimum wage (an increase of about 40 per cent), among other schemes.