Advertisement

Asian Angle | Memory allies: how Russia builds support in Southeast Asia by invoking shared historical narratives

  • Russia has used memory diplomacy as a way to bolster its political influence by reminding states of its role and assistance in their development
  • The memory of aid during the Cold War appears to be paying dividends, with some countries refraining from criticising Moscow’s actions in Ukraine

Reading Time:4 minutes
Why you can trust SCMP
Russia’s President Vladimir Putin meets his Lao counterpart Thongloun Sisoulith on the sidelines of the Third Belt and Road Forum in Beijing on October 17. Photo: AFP
Russia’s future in Southeast Asia is not yet written. But if present trends continue, the Kremlin will derive little comfort from the state of relations with the region.
Advertisement
Russia’s economic footprint in Southeast Asia is already tiny, at 0.5 per cent of Asean’s total trade. It is likely to shrink even further due to the country’s poor economic prospects in the wake of its invasion of Ukraine in February last year, and worsening demographics. Russian arms sales to the region have dropped off a cliff. Demand for Russian oil and gas will dwindle as regional states work towards a carbon-neutral future. Only an isolated Myanmar is interested in Russia’s nuclear power technology.

So rather than focus on an uncertain future, perhaps it is not surprising that when Russian leaders and diplomats interact with their Southeast Asian counterparts, they use memory diplomacy to assert what they consider to be the country’s rightful role as a great power.

Soviet troops disarming Japanese soldiers in northeast China in August 1945. File photo: Xinhua
Soviet troops disarming Japanese soldiers in northeast China in August 1945. File photo: Xinhua

British historian Jade McGlynn defines memory diplomacy as a form of public diplomacy whereby states try to bolster their political influence by “allying their own historical narratives with those of another country” to create “memory allies”. As McGlynn notes, the locus of Russia’s memory diplomacy is Europe, where Moscow extensively employs its selective view of the Soviet Union’s role in the defeat of Nazi Germany during World War II.

In Northeast Asia, Moscow has increasingly deployed memory diplomacy centred on that conflict to buttress relations with China and berate Japan for its support for Ukraine.

In Southeast Asia, that is much harder for Moscow to do, as the Soviet Union played almost no role in the Southeast Asian theatre.

Advertisement

It is hard but not impossible, especially if the memories of the second world war are manufactured. In August, Myanmar and Russia did just that when their defence ministers unveiled a statue in Moscow’s Patriot Park called “Allies of Myanmar Warriors” commemorating the Battle of Mandalay in early 1945.

Myanmar’s Senior General Min Aung Hlaing (right) and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov meet in Naypyidaw in August 2022. Photo: Russian Foreign Ministry Press Service via AP
Myanmar’s Senior General Min Aung Hlaing (right) and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov meet in Naypyidaw in August 2022. Photo: Russian Foreign Ministry Press Service via AP
Advertisement