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Alyssa Chen

Vietnam’s progress has been swift and quiet.
In the past five months alone, it has reclaimed more than 2 sq km (0.8 square miles) in the contested Spratly Islands, according to Beijing-based think tank the South China Sea Probing Initiative.
Hanoi is upgrading 11 of the 29 features it controls in the archipelago, which is also claimed – among others – by Beijing and known in China as the Nanshas.
If Vietnam keeps up the pace in the South China Sea, it could surpass China in island construction, by some estimates.
So far, China’s response has been muted – particularly when compared to its sovereignty rows with the Philippines in the same waters.
But maritime analysts say that Beijing is likely to be concerned about the upgrades Hanoi’s outposts, and while the two have open lines of communication to manage the disputes, the basic differences between them are expected to persist.


The Washington-based Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI) at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies has also noticed Vietnam’s expansion efforts.
In a report in June, it said Hanoi was on track this year to surpass previous records of island construction. It said that between November and May, Vietnam added around 692 acres (about 2.8 sq km) to 10 different features in the Spratly Islands, a sign of intensifying territorial advancement.
“Hanoi has been consistently expanding its occupied features in the Spratly Islands since 1970s … and there has been a dramatic acceleration in both the pace and scale of these modifications since the latest round of expansion starting in October 2021,” SCSPI direct Hu Bo said.
Hu said Vietnam – which occupies the most features among claimant states in the Spratlys – had been actively reclaiming land on 11 of those features and showed no signs of slowing down.
“Vietnam’s land reclamation efforts could potentially exceed the scale of China’s past activities in the region,” Hu said, adding that Beijing should openly deal with Hanoi, as “private protests are meaningless”.
Chen Xiangmiao, an associate research fellow at the Hainan-based National Institute for South China Sea Studies, said Vietnam aimed to leverage its island construction to strengthen control over the Spratlys, as it was likely to establish a constant presence of maritime enforcement vessels and expand the deployment of military facilities there.
“Previously, Hanoi maintained a limited number of bases in the Spratlys, capable only of accommodating small vessels. However, with recent upgrades to its port facilities, Vietnam is poised to maintain a continuous maritime law enforcement presence, which will significantly strengthen its control over the entire Spratly region,” Chen said.
Among the numerous reefs under Vietnamese control, Barque Canada Reef stood out as Vietnam’s largest outpost and the fourth-largest feature in the Spratlys. Malaysia also claims the reef and is concerned about Vietnam’s outposts constructions there.

The AMTI report noted that Barque Canada Reef spanned 1.66 sq km in May, and was the only Vietnamese-controlled outpost that could host a 3km (1.86-mile) runway capable of landing most Vietnamese military aircraft.
According to SCSPI, the reef measures 2.66 sq km and an airstrip was being rapidly built on it, with more than 410 metres of runway observed so far.
“The recent upgrades to outposts have enhanced Vietnamese capacity to accommodate large vessels – from thousands to nearly 10 thousand tonnes – showcasing their potential for future military ship docking,” Chen said. He said the defence structures being built were equipped with barracks, artillery and other military facilities.
The Spratly Islands are not under the control of any single nation but are variously located within the 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zones of Malaysia, Brunei, Vietnam and the Philippines, as well as within the scope of China’s extensive nine-dash line that claims the most of the waterway.




Chen said Vietnam’s attempts to “illegally and permanently” occupy those features would pose a significant challenge for China because they could potentially prompt similar actions from the Philippines and other claimant countries.
“Vietnamese vessels may venture into maritime zones around islands and reefs controlled by China, or attempt to establish a presence on some unoccupied features in the Spratlys,” Chen said.
“These manoeuvres could lead to an escalation in maritime interactions and competition between China and Vietnam, raising significant concerns for Chinese authorities.”
Chen said uncertainties surrounding Vietnam’s outpost upgrade were set to become even more complex.
China has so far offered a subdued response to Vietnam’s land reclamation efforts in the waters, in contrast to its more assertive stance towards the Philippines. Experts say the difference in Beijing’s approach is related to mutual political trust between the two socialist nations.
China has maintained a close exchange with Vietnam’s new top leadership following a power reshuffle. This week, military general Luong Cuong was elected as the new state president to succeed To Lam, who served as president even after his formal appointment as the general secretary of the ruling Communist Party in August.
Cuong was received by Chinese President Xi Jinping this month and they reaffirmed their commitment to strengthening ties between the two countries. To Lam visited China in August on his first foreign trip after taking office and pledge to solve their maritime dispute through dialogue.
Luo Liang, an assistant research fellow at the National Institute for South China Sea Studies, said it was too early to discern the foreign policy direction of the new administration in Vietnam, “however, a radical transformation towards its stance on China seems unlikely”.
According to Luo, Vietnam’s actions have been met with negotiations and objections through Beijing’s internal diplomatic channels.
“But frequent engagements between top officials and the smooth, open communication channels between China and Vietnam have enabled effective handling of maritime differences, helping to minimise a detrimental impact on bilateral ties,” Luo said.
Despite these efforts, the basic disagreements over the South China Sea continue to be a challenge, according to Luo.
In 2013, China embarked on a major island-building programme of its own in the Spratly Islands, building both civilian and military infrastructure, including military-grade airstrips, radar stations, harbours and housing for troops.
Beijing said they were built on features it controlled and that its actions were “lawful and justified”.


Vietnam’s resolute actions in defending its claims are poised to complicate China’s future efforts to assert its rights in the South China Sea, according to an associate professor in Guangzhou who specialises in the South China Sea, and has asked to remain anonymous.
Maritime face-offs between Beijing and Hanoi were not only persistent but were likely to escalate in future, the academic said, citing an incident this month in which Vietnam accused China of attacking 10 Vietnamese fishermen, leaving three with broken limbs. The confrontation also resulted in damage to their fishing gear and confiscation of their catch.
Beijing rejected the allegations, claiming the Vietnamese boats were fishing illegally in the area. China said it responded professionally and with restraint to stop the boats, and that no injuries resulted.
Following his participation in a regional forum in Laos, Chinese Premier Li Qiang travelled to Vietnam for discussions with To Lam and Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh, giving Beijing a chance to repair relations.
In the declaration document, Beijing and Hanoi committed to “refrain from taking actions that complicate the situation and widen disputes”.
Additionally, they agreed to initiate joint maritime development projects in areas of low sensitivity and improve interaction between their defence and security sectors.
“The intensity and severity of the next clash between China and Vietnam could surpass earlier incidents. However, frictions are likely to be temporarily stabilised and cooled down by high-level dialogues, but they fall short of addressing the core problem,” the academic in Guangzhou said.


This piece has been amended to clarify the number of islets controlled by Vietnam in the Spratly Island chain.


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Despite high-level dialogues, sea face-offs between Beijing and Hanoi are not only persistent but likely to escalate in future: academic


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