Opinion: a look at how China truly views potential war, as tensions rise over North Korea
Clues exist outside state media on Beijing’s perspective on war
It is a striking thing when war metaphors take a physical form. On April 14, a succession of beautiful days in the Yanbian Korean autonomous prefecture was broken by the arrival of immense dark clouds, heavy rain and flashes of lightning. The suddenly apocalyptic weather coincided with the arrival of rumours that the US military might engage in pre-emptive strikes on nearby North Korea.
As the rain lashed down outside his dusty shop, a bookseller in Yanji asked me if I thought April 15 would mark all-out war on the peninsula, and if that meant China would soon be dealing with a new cross-border government under South Korean control. I wanted to tell him that war on the Korean peninsula would result in utter carnage, but I thought it was better left unsaid, and quickly left for Shenyang.
The impact on China in any given conventional or nuclear Korean War scenario is typically dire. And in spite of the hours of talks supposedly dedicated to the issue between Chinese and US leaders and officials, there is very little information presented from these events that helps us to understand China’s options in such a nightmare scenario.
In dealing with North Korea, do Chinese strategists and thinkers see the United States and South Korea (along with Japan) as the main problem, and Pyongyang as an asset to manage? Or is Pyongyang the main culprit in stoking tensions again to the brink of war?
In assessing Chinese discourse on North Korea, we clearly need to go beyond statements and press briefings made at China’s foreign ministry and via Global Times editorials. The writings of security academics in China can provide a good barometer for the issue.
