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Opinion | Why fears of a Chinese naval base at Pakistan’s Gwadar port are overblown
- China’s continued investment in the port, despite its lacklustre performance, has raised suspicions that it is intended for use as a Chinese navy base
- However, despite its strategic location, the port is not as attractive as the ones in Karachi and Ormara, nor does Islamabad seem interested in a permanent Chinese naval presence
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Why you can trust SCMP
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On August 14, a roadside bomb targeted a convoy carrying Chinese engineers in Gwadar, Pakistan. While none were injured, the continued presence of Chinese workers in Gwadar, despite recurring terrorist attacks, might puzzle casual observers.
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By accepting Pakistan’s 40-year lease proposal for the Gwadar port’s construction and operation in 2013, Beijing also signed up to the inherent risks of working in Balochistan, a province marred by insurgency. The choice underscored a prioritisation of strategic interests over purely economic ones.
Despite Gwadar Port operating since 2008, it has seen minimal economic activity. While trade activity at Karachi Port and Port Qasim averaged 41 and 48 million tonnes respectively between 2020 and 2023, Gwadar Port reported under 100,000 tonnes.
This disparity, combined with persistent Chinese investment despite obvious risks, has bolstered the idea that Beijing may be helping Pakistan construct a larger naval facility at Gwadar for potential access and use by the Chinese navy.
In the early 2000s, Pakistan began reaching out to China to help build a naval base at Gwadar. By 2005, Pakistan’s naval chief had envisioned it as the nation’s third naval base, complementing the Karachi base and the Jinnah base at Ormara.
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Gwadar is seen as a probable location for a Chinese naval base due to its strategic position near the Strait of Hormuz and ability to host large warships. It is anticipated that Chinese navy warships will dock at Gwadar for repairs and replenishment, as they have in Karachi in the past. This would address China’s ability to sustain a fleet in the Indian Ocean and may allow Beijing access to regional maritime data.
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