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Opinion | To understand the Quad’s real ambitions, ignore its empty rhetoric and look at its actions in the Indo-Pacific
- Behind the talk about upholding the rules, maintaining a free and open region and supporting Asean centrality lies a US-led resolve to protect interests
- Even the Quad’s aim to have responsibility for the Indo-Pacific is questionable – Australia is the only member that borders both oceans
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Why you can trust SCMP
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After the rancorous China-US stand-off at the Shangri-la Dialogue in Singapore, the Quad looms ever larger in importance. The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue is a loose but rapidly evolving security arrangement of Australia, India, Japan and the United States. As it looks to expand via “Quad Plus” initiatives, this is a good time to analyse its intent and direction. The Quad leaders’ statement from their fifth meeting last month provides a starting point.
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In their words, the Quad intends to maintain a “free and open Indo-Pacific” and uphold “the rules-based international order”. This is code for the international system primarily built and dominated by the US and the West, and which preferentially benefits them. Quad leaders think it is increasingly under threat from a rising China and this must be deterred. They hope to do this by coordinating their strategy to constrain, contain and, if necessary, confront China.
The Quad’s agenda includes security issues like “upholding peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific maritime domain”, and “adherence to international law, particularly as reflected in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Unclos)”.
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The Quad has held military exercises before and its Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness could well provide a basis for cooperation on intelligence collection targeting China’s military. But it has also deftly merged this with an agenda that includes cooperation on non-traditional security issues like climate change, disaster risk, pandemics, infrastructure, cyber and maritime safety.
This is a sop to a wary India and Japan, and to Southeast Asian sensitivities. Indeed, the Quad would have evolved more quickly towards a hardcore security arrangement but for India’s non-alignment policy and markedly different world view – seen by its refusal to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine – and Japan’s constitutional constraint against deploying offensive weapons. Australia is also mindful of the sensitivities of China and Southeast Asia.
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