Akhil Ramesh

Opinion | India’s reasons for not joining West on Ukraine go beyond economics and arms deals

India’s imports of Russian arms, fertiliser, fossil fuels and more only partly explain why it has not joined the West’s sanctions against Russia

India has feet in both the global south and the Western alliance, and it has a vision of a multipolar world where it does not kowtow to any great power

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Akhil Ramesh

Published: 1:00am, 14 Apr 2022Updated: 2:06am, 14 Apr 2022

University of Chicago professor and author John Mearsheimer has drawn heavy criticism for his analysis of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. His argument that the war in Ukraine was the West’s fault because it supported states that neighboured Russia and expanded Nato has come under fire from many analysts in the Western world and unleashed a fresh wave of criticism of his body of work across traditional and social media.

Interestingly, his analysis is respected in India. The Indian administration under Prime Minister Narendra Modi has been no different from its predecessors in adopting a realist foreign policy that puts its own economic and political interests over any moral arguments of right and wrong in foreign affairs. The conflict in Ukraine is no exception.

India has refrained from voting against Russia at UN Security Council meetings over the Ukraine crisis on multiple occasions and has avoided publicly condemning Russia in any global forum. While Modi has advocated for peace in his phone calls with Russian President Vladimir Putin, his administration’s primary agenda during the conflict was getting Indian students trapped in Ukraine back home and preventing economic shocks for the domestic economy.

Chief minister of West Bengal Mamata Banerjee (centre) meets students who were studying in Ukraine and returned home, during a function in Kolkata on March 16. Photo: AFP

India’s position on Russia is not new and is unlikely to change any time soon. This has to do with macroeconomics and its multipolar vision for the world.

On the subject of macroeconomics, the challenge arises with India’s import dependency, particularly when it comes to energy and defence equipment. It is the world’s second-largest importer of crude oil and the largest when it comes to defence equipment, shipping in more than 80 per cent of its crude oil and between 60 and 65 per cent of its defence equipment. Given its high level of energy imports, volatility in crude prices has a direct impact on its inflation levels and foreign exchange reserves.

With the price of crude touching levels close to US$130 per barrel, it made economic sense when Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman said in response to buying Russian oil, “We have received quite a number of barrels, I would think three to four days’ supplies and this will continue” and “India’s overall interest is what is kept in mind”.

India is considering different mechanisms for paying for its imports. These include using rouble-rupee payment systems for trade with Russia to circumvent the sanctions imposed in the wake of it invading Ukraine.

In addition, around 50 per cent of India’s defence imports are of Russian origin. India’s dependence on Russia for supplying and maintaining its military makes antagonising Moscow out of the question.