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Xi Jinping and Donald Trump still need to find a strategic footing

David Lampton says despite some gains at the Mar-a-Lago summit, no agreement was reached on core security issues. Such strategic cooperation must anchor the Sino-US relationship

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David Lampton says despite some gains at the Mar-a-Lago summit, no agreement was reached on core security issues. Such strategic cooperation must anchor the Sino-US relationship
The real issue is not talk; it is agreement. It is here that we see problems. Illustration: Craig Stephens
The real issue is not talk; it is agreement. It is here that we see problems. Illustration: Craig Stephens
It is hard to know how to assess the just-concluded Mar-a-Lago summit between presidents Donald Trump and Xi Jinping (習近平). Should one feel exulted that an interpersonal train wreck was avoided between the two leaders, each of whom is hypersensitive about “face”? Should one feel despondent that, with so many issues crying out for cooperation, the two sides were unable to achieve and announce any significant, tangible outcomes?
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Or, should we sift through the detritus of the 21-hour event with hope, looking for shards of optimism?

If one searches for constructive pathways forward, they exist, but there is absolutely no assurance that either side will pursue them in the days, weeks and months ahead.

Whether this summit is declared a success, irrelevant, or something else, it is likely to be followed by US decisions and actions that will be viewed in Beijing as incompatible with China’s interests, a more cooperative relationship, and indeed incompatible with Beijing’s thinking about the requirements for regional stability. In the not-too-distant future, we will almost certainly see Washington make sensitive, and significant, weapons and weapons-related sales to Taiwan; impose more aggressive countervailing duties and anti-dumping actions against Chinese firms, not least steel-related; continue to deploy anti-missile systems in South Korea that Beijing sees as threatening (unless a new South Korean government reverses course); and we may see the initiation of secondary sanctions imposed on Chinese financial and other entities engaged in UN-prohibited transactions with North Korea.

Much of this was likely to happen irrespective of the summit’s outcomes. Although it is possible that understandings were reached that would, at least temporarily, avert some of these actions, it is a leap of faith to assume that is so. This brings us to the more verifiable outcomes of the summit.

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