Hong Kong's pan-democrats should seek an increase in the number of chief executive election candidates

Pan-democratic legislators have been calling for the withdrawal of the August 31 decision of the National People's Congress Standing Committee and for the reform process to begin anew. That's not going to happen in the current chief executive's term. Why do they ask for so much? Here's a novel idea: ask for only one of the restrictions in the August decision to be amended. Counter-propose that the number of candidates be from two to five, that's two more than the current maximum of three. Huh? What difference would that make for the pan-democrats, and why would the central government even entertain that now?

Need I highlight how significant such a concession would be when the central and Hong Kong governments have been saying all along that the August decision will not be changed. It would be the strongest confirmation that, with improved trust between the parties, the "actual situation" can be such that changes to the August decision become possible. The concession will be significant enough for the pan-democrats to seize it without appearing to back-pedal, and, far from losing votes, they stand to widen their vote share in the 2016 Legislative Council election, given the growing majority that wants political reform. But, most importantly, the change is needed because under the government's proposal, pan-democratic or other moderate legislators might (just barely) obtain the 50 per cent support from the nominating committee but not come within the top three positions to be nominated.

Of the three restrictions in the August decision, the one limiting the number of candidates is the most dispensable. The other two have some basis in either the words of Article 45 of the Basic Law or in the National People's Congress Standing Committee's December 2007 decision. Restricting the election to "two to three candidates" is driven entirely by expediency. Basic Law Committee chairman Li Fei 's explanations for this restriction are unconvincing. It is to "ensure a truly competitive election and present voters with real choices". More candidates would make it even more competitive with really real choices. It would also "serve to avoid problems such as complicated electoral procedures and high election costs caused by having too many candidates".

Having two more candidates cannot make it more complicated than the vote choices in district council, Election Committee and Legco (functional and geographical) elections. Any additional costs of accommodating two more candidates would surely not be substantial. Finally, it is said that it "fits relatively well with the experience gained from previous [chief executive] elections". But we have never had an election in which Election Committee members could nominate more than one candidate (as now proposed by the government) - this is quite significant.

However, the most serious criticism of the "two to three candidates" restriction is that it could work contrary to the democratic principle of majority rule contained in Article 45 itself. Why should a recommended candidate who has majority support from nominating committee members be denied the opportunity to stand for election? The restriction in its current form does exactly this, arbitrarily or only for convenience sake. To deny nomination to a fourth or fifth candidate who has majority support in the nominating committee is to frustrate that committee's constitutional power of nomination and to defy the majority rule principle within Article 45. There needs to be flexibility, and extending the limit to five candidates makes much more legal and practical sense.

Now, why does this matter at all to pan-democratic legislators, generally assumed to be unable to secure 50 per cent support from an Election Committee turned nominating committee? With nominating committee members having the power of multiple nominations, we need to question this assumption. Nominating committee membership can be roughly divided into three categories: first, those willing to support only pro-establishment candidates; second, those willing to support both pro-establishment and non-establishment candidates; and third, those willing to support only non-establishment candidates.