This summer, US economists Barry Eichengreen and Douglas Irwin published a very interesting paper on the roots of protectionism in the Depression. The authors argue that in the 1930s the likelihood of countries resorting to trade protection, most importantly the raising of tariff barriers, was strongly correlated with their inability to adjust via the exchange rate mechanism.
During the 1920s and shortly after the onset of the financial crisis beginning in 1929, several countries either abandoned the gold standard or pegged their currencies to gold at levels much below the prewar parity.
These countries all subsequently experienced rapid improvements in their trade balances and suffered much less from the ravages of the global contraction.
But other countries, most obviously the United States, were sharply constrained in their ability to adjust their currencies. Until the accession to the presidency in 1933 of Franklin Roosevelt, a gold sceptic, and given the enormous gold reserves accumulated by the US over the course of the decade, there was little appetite in Washington for what seemed like unorthodox monetary policies.
Consequently the US and other countries that were unwilling or unable to engage in competitive devaluations suffered much of the brunt of the adjustment from countries that were less constrained. The former were the countries, according to the authors, that were the most likely to resort to the 'second-best' adjustment mechanisms of tariff barriers.
