The flaws with the functional constituencies are so numerous and entrenched, it is difficult to say exactly where reform should begin. There are the obvious points: extend the vote to the remaining 95 per cent of the electorate who are presently excluded; eliminate the gross disparities in constituency size; recognise more 'functions' so that stay-at-home spouses, vets, and others, can vote; and abolish corporate voting to stop the unfair advantage of using controlled entities to realise multiple votes.
The realist, of course, would say that these reforms are really disguised attempts to bring in universal suffrage through the back door, and the government would never accept them. The idealist, on the other hand, says nothing short of universal suffrage is universal suffrage; these measures only remove the most pressing defects of the system.
Both would nonetheless agree that the government's policy of confining the functional constituencies' electorate to its present size and composition, adopted after 1997 in response to then governor Chris Patten's 1995 reforms, is unwise and problematic. This policy not only results in arbitrary line-drawing, it is also inconsistent with the Basic Law principle of gradual and orderly progress towards universal suffrage.
If we must have a system of functional representation, we need to return to basic principles when thinking about reform. The manner in which sectoral interests attain representation in the legislature must conform to the basic values and principles of a civil society.
In this respect, I propose that reform follow an organic theory that has at its core two fundamental precepts. First, artificial limits and arbitrary distinctions should have no place in a modern system. Simply stated, the system should be rational. The present system is replete with anomalies and unjustified restrictions. For example, there is little reason why only 80 individuals were registered to vote in the 2000 financial services constituency, a figure hardly reflective of the number in the sector. The makeshift architecture of today's system is a product more of politically driven historical events and accidents than of a reasoned exercise of collective planning and policymaking.
Many anomalies are due to a breach of the second precept of the organic theory; that the electoral system must adhere to the dictates of the rule of law. When the law confers a right or benefit, it must be done in such a way as to be sufficiently clear and certain as to when that right or benefit can be enjoyed. The present system leaves too much unchecked discretion to the executive on critical matters.
