Submarines won’t prepare Australia for what China could do to it in a war
- Australia’s new national defence strategy focuses on countering its ‘adversary’ on the battlefield, yet its true vulnerability lies elsewhere – on its economy’s heavy reliance on China
- Diplomatic engagement will protect Australia far better than any military deterrence can
Australia’s recently released National Defence Strategy focuses on preparing the military to withstand Chinese coercion. The updated weapons priorities are little more than advanced iterations of the old, designed for denial of battle space.
The idea that China would block its own trade-critical sea lanes is clearly a policy oxymoron embraced by Australia.
Former Home Affairs Department chief Michael Pezzullo said the government should prepare a “war book” because of the “credible” risk of conflict by 2030. In shades of the Blitz, he spoke of the need for plans covering evacuating and sheltering population centres. The concept fails to appreciate the non-lethal nature of modern conflict as it applies, in particular, to Australia.
Let’s for a moment consider this: what would China need to do to bring Australia to its knees in a modern conflict? Australia’s unique vulnerability lies not in its geography, nor its trade routes.
A partial or complete suspension of orders for three or six months would not cause the Chinese economy to collapse, but the Australian economy would hit the hall. There would be no need to disrupt shipping in the South China Sea, as suggested in the defence strategy.
Is Australia creating US$246 billion out of thin air to buy new Aukus subs?
Not a single submarine needs to be deployed, nor a shot fired. No Australian system needs to be hacked. This is not warfare as the Colonel Blimps know it.
If China does not need to physically block trade routes to hurt Australia, then how can Australia prevent such economic damage?
Foreign affairs, which is comparatively poorly funded at present, holds the answer. For a fraction of the cost of the Aukus submarines, Australia’s diplomatic engagement with China could be increased tenfold. For a fraction of the cost, Australia could boost university studies of China and gain a serious depth of understanding of China to replace the simplistic cartoon characterisations that now drive Australia’s public and policy discourse.
The second step is to recognise the legitimacy of China’s desire to play a more active role in formulating the global rules-based order. Like US President Joe Biden, Australia seems to think compliance with American demands is the same as cooperation. President Xi Jinping wants cooperation based on the United States’ acknowledgement of the legitimacy of China’s perspective. Global regulatory structures that do not recognise China are no longer fit for purpose.
As Albanese goes to Beijing, Australia must rethink its allegiances
Currently, Australian foreign policy takes an adversarial approach to China where almost everything China does is wrong or seen as a threat to Australia. This lack of respect is deeply woven into the fabric of current Australian diplomatic and military policy. True to its mission, the military views the world through a gunsight.
Diplomacy can and should take a different perspective. Foreign Minister Penny Wong has smoothed the rhetoric, but Australia’s current position is not substantially distinguishable from the aggressive stance adopted by the previous government.
Marles wants to ensure Australia is able to resist coercion but submarines don’t sit at the negotiating table. Economic warfare by regulation is resolved with diplomacy, not guns.
Daryl Guppy is an international financial technical analysis expert and a former national board member of the Australia China Business Council. The views expressed here are his own