India can be alternative for Central Asian nations fearing Chinese yoke

Counterterrorism, development and other concerns have sparked renewed political interest in Central Asia, particularly in China and India
While India’s influence in the region is limited by a lack of direct access and China’s heft, it can still be an alternative to those wary of Beijing

C. Uday Bhaskar

Published: 3:30am, 7 Feb 2022

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The Beijing Winter Olympics that opened on Friday got off to a discordant start with major democracies choosing a diplomatic boycott of the event to protest against China’s human rights abuses. Within the Asian context, this has been exacerbated by India’s decision to officially distance itself from the Games.

The trigger was China’s decision to include a People’s Liberation Army soldier wounded in the June 2020 border clash in Ladakh in the opening ceremony. A terse Indian foreign ministry statement said it was “regrettable” that China chose to designate Qi Fabao as one of the torch-bearers for the Olympic torch relay.

However, one part of Asia was fully represented – the leaders of the five Central Asian states. This collective presence is also an indication of their support for President Xi Jinping, along with 16 other leaders, led by Russian President Vladimir Putin.

The five Central Asian states – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan – were part of the former Soviet Union and became independent nations after the end of the Cold War. Their geographical location in the heart of Asia has accorded these sparsely populated, resource-rich nations significant contemporary geopolitical relevance.

Kazakh athletes march in during the opening ceremony of the Beijing 2022 Winter Olympic Games, at the National Stadium in Beijing, on February 4. Photo: AFP

This has been further accentuated by the US withdrawal from Afghanistan and the resulting power vacuum. Renewed political interest in Central Asia was reflected in two little-noticed developments in late January that have a complex regional and global strategic subtext.

China and India have hosted the five Central Asian leaders at back-to-back virtual summits. The underlying message was a reiteration of their respective high-level political commitment to the “stans”, as these five nations are sometimes called.

Xi held his virtual summit on January 25, two days before India’s summit, to commemorate 30 years of the bilateral ties between Beijing and the five “stans”. He offered US$500 million in aid and also pledged to increase trade and connectivity with the region, which is a critical component of the Belt and Road Initiative.

In his official remarks, Xi noted the shared interests China had with the Central Asian states. Their joint efforts to fight “the three forces of terrorism, separatism and extremism, transnational organised crime and drug trafficking” and reject “external interference or attempts to instigate colour revolutions” have helped shore up stability in the region, Xi said.

A day later on January 26, the five Central Asian leaders were invited to be chief guests at India’s Republic Day parade. A meeting that day with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi was cancelled over Covid-19 concerns, but a virtual summit was held the next day.

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi (top right) greets the leaders of Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan at their virtual summit on January 27. Photo: EPA-EFE / India Press Information Bureau handout

The theme of shared security concerns against the backdrop of Afghanistan was conveyed by Modi when he noted: “We all have the same concerns and objectives for regional security. We are all concerned about the developments in Afghanistan. In this context also, our mutual cooperation has become even more important for regional security and stability.”

Modi has made Central Asia a high priority since taking office and in 2015 became the first Indian prime minister to visit all five “stans”. India’s “Connect Central Asia” initiative has sought to energise ties along various tracks, and New Delhi’s membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation allows for multilateral engagement with China, Russia and other regional countries on counterterrorism.

Afghanistan puts China’s vision of SCO to the test

All these nations share this security concern to some degree. Following the US withdrawal, Afghanistan’s potential to nurture radical Islamist ideology has become a test case in demonstrating how geopolitical discord blunts meaningful collective effort.

While Russia has provided the five Central Asian nations a security, sociopolitical and cultural umbrella in the past 30 years, China has been their major trade and economic partner while also providing financial support for large infrastructure projects as part of the Belt and Road Initiative. Beijing has set a goal of increasing bilateral trade with Central Asia to US$70 billion by 2030, with an eye on developing connectivity and the region’s hydrocarbon potential.

China’s energy needs are expected to keep increasing each year, and natural gas from Central Asia – in particular Kazakhstan – is an important commodity. Beijing is also invested in land routes, railways and pipelines through the region that will allow it to reach Europe and the Indian Ocean. When realised, the density of this connectivity will improve China’s energy security and other vulnerabilities through the maritime domain.

In contrast, India’s presence in Central Asia is more modest, with just US$2 billion in annual trade. India has provided development aid but is constrained by a lack of direct access to the region and is dwarfed by China’s deep pockets and large trade profile. While the Indian approach to Central Asia is one of consensual collaboration, China’s seems to be hegemonic.

The “debt trap” often associated with Chinese aid is a concern, and it is in this context that India can be an attractive alternative for Central Asian nations. Deeply aware of the major power intrusion and intimidation experienced by the region, an 18th-century Kazakh metaphor about a rider and their horse is instructive. “The Russian yoke is made of leather that can gradually be worn out, while Chinese yoke is made of iron and one can’t free oneself from it.”

While the United States and Russia are currently focused on Ukraine, Central Asia is still part of their strategic calculus and the return of the “Great Game” is brewing. Once the Winter Olympics finish, the geopolitics of Eurasia could become more contested than expected.

Commodore C. Uday Bhaskar is director of the Society for Policy Studies (SPS), an independent think tank based in New Delhi